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Abstract 
It has been emphasized that international promotion activities such as state visits or the 
presence of embassies, consulates and export promotion agencies help foster trade when 
there are search costs and/or uncertainty. In this paper we try to disentangle the differential 
effect that foreign service (embassies and consulates) has on both the establishment of trade 
links with countries, and the effect on trade volumes with already existing trading partners 
(the extensive and intensive margins at the country level). Using the estimation procedure 
suggested by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2007) and a cross-section of 21 exporters 
and 162 importers as in Rose (2005), we find that the presence of a foreign service office in 
a given country increases the probability of trading with that partner between 11% and 18%, 
but that it has no effect on the volume of trade with already existing trading partners. We 
then proceed to evaluate the importance of the extensive margin at the sectoral level, finding 
that these probabilities are substantially larger for more differentiated sectors. 
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1 Introduction
Do international promotion activities foster trade? Do they help create new trade links
among previously non-trading countries (the extensive margin at the country level)
and/or do they help intensify those links (the intensive margin at the country level).
This paper tries to answer these questions.
Of course we are not the first ones to address some of these issues. Export promo-
tion agencies, foreign missions and foreign service (henceforth, international promotion
activities or IPA) have been widely used to promote export activities of countries, with
the goal of increasing export volumes, the number of firms that engage in exporting
activities, the number of countries reached by domestic firms, and the diversification
of those exporting activities in markets and goods. As these promotion activities be-
came more and more important, an empirical literature emerged which tries to analyze
both their importance and their efficiency (among others, see, for instance, Kessing and
Singer, 1991a, 1991b, Lederman et al, 2006, Volpe et al, 2007, and Rose, 2005), with
different results depending on the type of activity, the countries in the sample, the time
frame, and the outcome being analyzed.1
In general, most of these studies have focused their analysis on the effect on either
total bilateral trade volumes or on whether they helped increasing the number of prod-
ucts exported to a given country. However, to the best of our knowledge, nobody has
tried to quantify the potentially differential effect of these activities on the extensive
(whether they help to find new trading partners at the country level) and the intensive
margin (the effect on trade volumes with already existing trading partners). This is the
aim of this paper.
The motivation for it stems from the same reasoning that is typically used to justify
the need for international promotion activities: uncertainty. In a world without frictions,
international promotion activities should play no role; they would not have any effect
on exporting activities since there is nothing stopping firms from engaging in exporting
activities whenever it is profitable to do so. The most repeated justification for the role
of international promotion activities is that of imperfect information. For instance, firms
may not know which exporting markets are profitable with certainty, the contracting
procedures in a foreign country or the enforcement of those contracts may be uncertain,
or consumers in the foreign country may not be well informed about the characteristics of
the domestic products. In this case, promotion activities may help eliminate or, at least,
reduce these uncertainties that abound in both sides of the market. More importantly, if
uncertainty is the driving force, are we sure that the effects of these promotion activities
go beyond those of establishing new links? The answer to this question may have
important policy implications. For instance, if international promotion activities only
have an effect on the establishment of new links, it may be hard to justify the increasing
1See below for a review of their results.
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number of export promotion agencies and their enlarging expenditures. Furthermore,
as Rauch (1996, 1999) has argued, the lack of information may lead to the formation
of informal networks. Whether these informal networks leave no role for government
sponsored international promotion activities is an empirical issue.
Several theoretical contributions suggest that the effect on both margins may not be
the same. Among them, in a recent paper, Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia (2007), we
have argued that informational externalities generated through other firms actions may
be an alternative way of obtaining information about a given market. In particular, by
observing how other firms are performing in a given foreign market, producers trying
to decide whether to enter that given market can make inference about its expected
profitability. The problem is that this same information providing device simultaneously
generates incentives to free-ride on information, which may make firms more reluctant
to enter new markets.
In this context, international promotion activities should have a large effect as they
help establish new trade links, but not necessarily explain their trade volumes once
those links have been formed. Informational externalities may be enough to disseminate
information. On the other hand, Rauch (1999) argues that establishing a link is not
enough since uncertainty may be product specific and product life cycles are limited,
giving a rationale for why ongoing international promotion activities may have an effect
on trade volumes even with existing partners.
To quantify the relative importance of the two margins we use the procedure in
Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2007) (henceforth HMR). Due to data availability, we
only analyze the role of foreign missions (embassies and consulates, as in Rose, 2005)
helping establish new links and increasing volumes with those trade links already formed.
This framework also allows us to correct for selection bias of trade link formation and the
heterogeneity of exporters (see the empirical implementation and HMR for the details
on this).
We perform a two-stage procedure that allows us to ascertain the relative importance
of foreign service on the intensive and extensive margins using cross-sectional bilateral
trade data. The first stage allows us to generate controls for the formation of new
trade links and for the effects of firm heterogeneity on bilateral trade volumes which
we include in our second stage, where we perform a gravity-type estimation of bilateral
trade flows.
We find that foreign service agencies play a crucial role in the formation of trade
links (extensive margin) and this is the only channel through which it has an effect
on aggregate bilateral trade volumes. More concretely, we find that the presence of
a foreign service office increases the probability of trade by between 11% and 18%,
depending on the specification. These results are robust to the potential endogeneity
arising from the fact that countries might endogenously set up international offices in
3
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those markets which present the largest potential for their exports. We also apply this
procedure to the estimation of sectoral bilateral trade links and volumes. We find very
similar effects on the trade link formation properties of foreign service offices with the
effect being larger for those sectors producing more differentiated goods, which might
be subject to larger uncertainties when accessing foreign markets.
The empirical literature on the impact of international promotion activities is large
so we only mention those papers most related to our work. Kessing and Singer (1991,
1991b) evaluated the efficiency of export promotion offices (EPO) finding very negative
results. Lederman et al (2006), using several measures of EPOs activities, find that for
each dollar of export promotion there is a corresponding $300 increase in the volume
of exports. Nitsch (2005) finds that a typical external visit by a government official
increases bilateral exports by 10 %. Volpe et al (2007) find a strong effect of EPO on the
number of products exported to a given country, while embassies and consulates (foreign
service) seem to have no effect. The paper that is more related to ours is Rose (2005)
which estimates the effect of foreign service on total trade volumes finding that bilateral
exports increase around 6-10% for each additional consulate. However, as mentioned
before, none of these papers try to disentangle the differential effect of international
promotion activities on the extensive and intensive margins at the country level, nor
they try to correct for selection bias of trade link formation and the heterogeneity of
exporters that access a given market. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the
first to do so.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the data used in the estimation
whose procedure is described in detail in section 3. Section 4 provides a description
of the results we obtain both for aggregate and sectoral bilateral trade flows, along
with some robustness checks. Finally, section 5 concludes and presents some policy
implications.
2 Data description
2.1 Dataset construction
We are interested in estimating the determinants of the existence of bilateral trade flows
among countries and, therefore, we need to take into account all possible trade flows, not
only those that take positive values. To this effect, we construct the most comprehensive
dataset possible considering every possible bilateral trade flow between any two trading
partners in any two-digit SITC sector. Into this empty dataset we merge data on
bilateral trade flows, on individual country characteristics, and on characteristics of
each bilateral relationship.
The data on bilateral trade flows at the sectoral level has been obtained from Feen-
stra et al. (2005). These data contain information about bilateral trade flows between
4
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1962 and 2000 at the sectoral level up to the 4-digit SITC disaggregation level. We only
use the data for year 1999 which is the most recent year for which more reliable data
is available. Furthermore, for computational purposes, we collapse these data into its
corresponding 66 two-digit SITC categories and we drop observations corresponding to
the one-digit category 9 in the SITC which corresponds to “Commodities and transac-
tions not classified elsewhere in the SITC”. This leaves us with data for 62 two-digit
SITC categories as listed in Table 1 in the Data Appendix. The aggregate bilateral
trade flows among countries were obtained by adding across the sectoral data for every
country pair.
Data on individual country’s characteristics as well as data on each bilateral relation-
ship were obtained from the dataset used in Ruiz and Vilarrubia (2007) which provides
a thorough description of the data construction process. These data include a large
number of controls used in the standard gravity equation estimation of bilateral trade
flows such as distance (measured as the distance between each country’s capital cities),
the presence of a land border, the presence of a common language, of a common colo-
nizer, membership in the same trade agreement and currency union. As for individual
country characteristics, the dataset contains information about GDP, GDP per capita,
area and maritime access (i.e. it has information about the island and landlocked status
of each country as well as the number of miles of coast it has).
Finally, we merge data on the number of embassies, consulates, and trade promotion
offices from any given origin country in any other host country. These data were obtained
from Rose (2005) and they contain, not only the number of these offices but also the
number of workers they employ. We associate the origin country with the exporter
country and the host country as the importer and we proceed to investigate the role
that these embassies have played on each margin. This interesting dataset has two
unfortunate drawbacks. Firstly, it is only available for 21 exporting countries which
report their presence (in terms of embassies, consulates and trade promotion offices)
vis-à-vis around 163 countries and territories. The list of exporters and importers can
be found on table 3 in the Data Appendix where the subset of exporters is identified
in bold font within the (more comprehensive) list of importers. Secondly, these data
are only available for years 2002 and 2003 and, even then, with a very reduced amount
of intertemporal variation which naturally leads our analysis to focus on cross-sectional
results instead of the potentially richer panel effects that we might observe.
2.2 Description of the Data
After combining data from all these sources we are left with data on just over 210,000
observations which correspond to all potential bilateral trade flows corresponding to all
possible links between 21 exporters and 163 importers in 62 sectors.
As reported by Helpman et al. (2007), there is a significant portion of non-existing
5
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observations in international trade flows. If we were to restrict our analysis only to
aggregate trade flows among countries, our data shows that almost 8% of all potential
trade flows between countries are, in fact, zeros and that, therefore, we obviously have
data on over 92% of all possible aggregate bilateral trade flows.2 The share of positive
trade flows in our data is significantly larger than the one reported by Helpman et
al. (2007). This could largely be attributable to our sample containing a reduced set
of exporters which actually correspond to some of the most active exporters in the
world. Nevertheless, and as one would expect, the share of non-existing trade flows
increases substantially if we consider sectoral data: over 60% of flows in the average
sector correspond to non-existing flows. Table 4 reports the share of existing (positive)
and non-existing (zero or non-reported) trade flows among all potential trade flows in
every sector. As expected, the share of zeros varies greatly from one sector to the
next, from 98.3% of zeros in sector 35 (“Electric current”) to just over 33% in sector 77
(“Electrical machinery and appliances”), just to cite the two bounds.
Table 5 provides a summary of all variables used in the estimation grouped into
three separate categories. The first set of variables correspond to the standard variables
used in country-level standard gravity estimations of bilateral trade flows. It includes
data on the value of bilateral sectoral trade flows, on its existence, on the value of
aggregate bilateral trade flows and its existence as well as information on some of its
most commonly considered determinants such as distance, presence of a common bor-
der, language, colonizer or an index of religious similarity and membership in the same
free trade area and currency union. In the second category, we include information
about the number and presence of official agencies between the source (exporter) and
host (importer) country as well as information on the attractiveness and geopolitical
importance of each country that we use in the instrumentation of the decision to set up
an embassy. The third set of variables correspond to variables describing the state of
information technology in each country: availability and density of internet, bandwidth
and computers. We use these variables to construct the variable “information technol-
ogy” that we use in one of the robustness checks of our results. These data correspond
to 1999 and were obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database put
together by the World Bank.
3 Estimation procedure
3.1 Econometric Procedure
In order to investigate the relative importance of the extensive and intensive margin in
international trade, we employ a two-stage procedure very similar to the one developed
2An analysis of flows using the largest possible dataset with 168 exporters and 168 importers reveals
these figures to be close to 58% and 42% respectively.
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by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2007). This procedure aims to correct for two
effects: (1) the relative importance of the extensive and an intensive margin in adjusting
the total volume of trade, and (2) the effect on trade volumes of non-observable firm
heterogeneity . The procedure constitutes an extension of the classic Heckman (1979)
sample selection correction procedure augmented in order to take into account the
heterogeneous nature of the agents determining aggregate bilateral trade flows among
countries.3 In this setup, parameter identification requires the existence of a variable
that affects the probability of observing a non-zero flow between two countries (the
intensive margin) but not the volume (the extensive margin). In other words and
thinking in terms of firm’ decisions, we need a variable that affects the decision to
enter a given market (that is, it affects the fixed costs), but it does not affect the
decision of how much to produce in that country (it does not affect variable costs).
Alternatively, a variable which affects both decisions in opposite directions, as does the
land border dummy variable, would also work.4
More formally, in a first stage, we estimate a probit equation of the type:
ρTijs = Pr [1(Tijs) = 1] = Φ(Xijs, Zijs, ε
T
ijs), (1)
where 1(Tijs) is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 when there is a non-zero
trade flow from country i to country j in sector s, and zero otherwise; Φ is the cdf of
the standardized normal distribution, Xijs corresponds to variables which affect both
the probability and the volume of trade, and Zijs are variables that are used for our
exclusion restriction i.e. those that affect the probability of observing a positive volume
of trade without actually affecting the trade volume if these was to be positive. In this
paper, we consider the role that trade promotion institutions play in promoting the
creation of new trade links via a reduction in the existing uncertainty faced by domestic
firms when pondering access to foreign markets. More precisely, we focus on the role
that the presence of even a single agency has and thus, in our benchmark, we define
Zijs as an indicator variable for the presence of at least one trade promotion agency of
the exporting country in the importing country.
We include in Xijs variables such as (the log of) bilateral distance (between capital
cities) as well as indicator variables for the presence of a land border, of a common
language, and common membership in a regional free trade area or a currency union.
Given our assumption on the fixed effect nature of the error structure, we can not use
among Xijs any variable which are either exporter or importer specific such as GDP,
population, sea access, or land area.
Following this regression, we construct the inverse Mills ratio as bηijs which is included
3HMR show that the second form of correction is even more important than the first, biases in the
results are larger when failing to correct for heterogeneity.
4For details on how to go from firm level decisions to aggregate flows, see Helpman et al. (2007).
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as a regressor in the next step. Also with the results from the first stage, we are able
to construct a polynomial approximation to the function h(ωijs) that accounts for the
correction for firm size heterogeneity as suggested by Helpman et al. (2007).
In this study, none of the control variables (Xijs) we consider varies at the sectoral-
bilateral level which implies that the sector-by-sector estimation of equation (1) would
be equivalent to the estimation of a pooled regression with all sectoral data where we
included sectoral fixed effects, and we allowed the coefficients of all controls and interest
variables to vary by sector. The error term, εTijs, is assumed to contain an exporter fixed
effect for each sector with the following structure εTijs = δ
T
is+ ν
T
ijs where ν
T
ijs is assumed
to be a well-behaved error term.5
The estimation of equation (1) using non-linear methods, such as a probit, together
with the use of exporter dummies to perform the fixed effects estimation. might be
subject to the incidental parameter problem and introduce a bias in the coefficients of
the rest of variables (Xijs, Zijs). However, as pointed out by Fernández-Val (2007), this
bias does not affect the estimated marginal effects and, therefore, the predicted values
obtained for the dependent variable. As a robustness check, we also estimate equation
(1) using a linear probability method where we can safely use a full set of exporter
dummies to account for the fixed effects nature of the error term.
After constructing ηijs and the polynomial approximation to h(ωijs), we include
these two terms in the gravity estimation of trade volumes:
Tijs = f(Xijs,bηijs, h(bωijs), εGijs), (2)
where εGijs is an error term which contains a exporter and importer fixed effect as
εGijs = δ
G
is + δ
G
js + ν
G
ijs, where ν
G
ijs is a well-behaved error term.
For the purposes of our paper, we apply the previous estimation procedure to both
aggregate bilateral trade flows as well as to sectoral flows.
3.2 International promotion activities and the extensive margin
The role that IPA may have in the creation of new trade links and not in volumes of
existing trade links deserves some discussion. For this to be true (and for our estimation
procedure to allow proper identification) it has to be the case that their existence only
affects the decision of firms to enter a new market while it does not have an effect on
their decisions once they have entered that market.6 In other words, IPA should only
have an effect on fixed costs but not on variable costs, as emphasized by HMR.
As noted in the introduction, IPA may play a role on export decisions if there is
some market failure, and in particular, the most emphasized failure is the lack of infor-
5We do not include importer fixed effects in this stage since, when we control for endogeneity
concerns on the setup of foreign service offices, we would not have enough variability in our data.
6 In particular, it should not affect their production decisions after entrance.
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mation. As Rose (2005) points out, one of the objectives that the US State Department
establishes for itself is that of “creating jobs at home by opening markets abroad.”7
Furthermore, as Lederman et al. (2006) describe, the role of IPA is
“to help (potential) exporters find markets for their products, as well as
provide them with a better understanding of products demanded in different
export markets. One can divide the services offered by EPAs into four broad
categories: 1) country image building (advertising, promotional events, but
also advocacy); 2) export support services (exporter training, technical as-
sistance, capacity building, including regulatory compliance, information on
trade finance, logistics, customs, packaging, pricing); 3) marketing (trade
fairs, exporter and importer missions, follow-up services offered by repre-
sentatives abroad); and 4) market research and publications (general, sector,
and firm level information, such as market surveys, on-line information on
export markets, publications encouraging firms to export, importer and ex-
porter contact databases).”
From all this, it is clear that IPA activities may affect the decision of firms to
enter a given market. On the other hand, it is hard to make a strong case on whether
those activities also help reduce variable costs and thus increase the intensive margin
in those countries given their expressed objectives. Whether this is the case remains an
empirical matter. Thus, it seems reasonable to use the presence of foreign missions as
our exclusion restriction to identify the extensive and the intensive margins.
Having said that, we want to establish whether it is actually the case that IPA and
uncertainty play a role mainly through the extensive margin at the country level. This is
particularly important if we want to compare our results with those of Rose (2005), that
shows (without distinguisihing between margins) that the effect of foreign service is of
a 6-10% increase in bilateral exports for each additional consulate. For this reason, we
use alternative measures to identify the role of the extensive (relative to the intensive)
margin. See below for the discussion on this.
It is important to note the possible drawbacks of our analysis. First of all, we have
endogeneity concerns, which are addressed as in Rose (2005), and discussed at further
length in the next sub-section. Second, we are using the cross-sectional variance to
analyze the impact of IPA on the extensive and intensive margins at the country level,
which is an intrinsically dynamic matter. We do this because of data restrictions since
our sample does not contain sufficient variation on the presence or number of foreign
missions over time to identify the dynamic effect. This may be a concern if, first,
given that we already address reverse causality, there remain omitted variables that
determine both the existence of a trade link between two countries and the presence of
7See Rose (2005) for similar quotes about other countries’ foreign missions objectives.
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embassies, consulates, and trade promotion offices between them. Nevertheless, as long
as the standard gravity controls such as common border, colonial links and others are
capturing this possibility, this should not be a concern. Secondly, the same reasoning
applies if we still had omitted variables at the importer or exporter level that affect the
relative importance of the two margins, which again are likely to be controlled for by
the importer and exporter fixed effects we include.
Finally, it could be argued that the use of aggregate flows does not allow us to iden-
tify the effect on the extensive margin at the firm level. That is, IPA may be important
for the establishment of new trade links with new countries and, also, after the link is
formed, for the entrance of new firms and products in those same countries. However,
if this was the case, we should see this reflected on total volumes, something that we
do not observe in our results below. A reason for this, as discussed earlier, may be
that as we have emphasized in Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia (2007), informational
externalities generated through other firms’ actions may be an alternative way of ob-
taining information about a given market. In particular, by observing how other firms
are performing in a given foreign market, producers trying to decide whether to enter
that given market can make inference about its expected profitability and, ultimately,
have an impact on the intensive margin at the country level. So, as long as our estima-
tion strategy is convincing enough, we do not seem to identify an effect of IPA on the
extensive margin at the firm level after a link between any two countries has already
been formed.
3.3 Endogeneity concerns
When using the presence of embassies and consulates of the exporting country in the
importing country, and as Rose (2005) rightfully points out, a potential endogeneity
problem emerges. The source of this lies on the fact that the decision to set up an
embassy or a foreign trade promotion office might itself be endogenous: the decision
of country i to set up an office in country j might be related to the potential that
market j offers to firms in country i. If this is the case, our identification procedure
for the extensive vis-à-vis the intensive margin would not be correct. We recognize this
possibility and attempt to correct for it by introducing another stage in our procedure,
where we proxy the probability of setting up a foreign mission on a set of variables
that attempt to capture the general (tourist) attractiveness of a country, as well as
its geopolitical importance. A first set of instruments includes the number of Zagat’s
guides, the number of Condé-Nast Top 100 destinations in the country, the number of
Lonely Planet guides, the number of Economist city guides as well as the volume of oil
reserves held by the country. Also, as in Rose (2005), as a robustness check, we extend
our instrument set to include information about other guides (Michelin and Baedeker)
as well as information about natural gas reserves. Given that our variable of interest
10
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is the indicator for the presence of an official trade promotion agency, we estimate a
probit model on the probability that country i has set up a foreign mission in country
j and thus, we run the regression:
ρZij = Pr[1(Zij = 1) = Φ(Xij , Tij , ε
Z
ij), (3)
where we also include the bilateral characteristics of country i and j as well as the
aforementioned set(s) of instruments (Tij), and an error term which we assume to be
well-behaved.
We estimate this equation and include its predicted value bρZij as a regressor in equa-
tion (1) instead of Zij . It is important to keep in mind that in this additional stage both
the dependent and independent variables are the same across all sectors. Thus, when
doing the estimation at the sector level the instrument for the presence of a trade pro-
motion agency is going to be exactly the same for all sectors as well as for the estimation
of aggregate bilateral trade flows.
4 Results
4.1 Aggregate results
We first estimate the role that the presence of trade promoting agencies plays in pro-
moting increases in international trade via the intensive margin, that is, by fostering
the formation of trade links at the aggregate level. It is important to keep in mind
that in our aggregate data, only 8% of all potential trade flows correspond to zero trade
flows. Table 6 shows the results of estimating our first stage, to which we also refer as
the selection equation.
The coefficient on the presence of a foreign service office is shown to have a positive
and significant effect on the formation of trade links among countries. Our findings
suggest that the presence of a foreign service office from an exporter in an importer
country increases the probability of the existence of a trade link by over 11%. The
effect of distance in this selection equation has the expected sign and it is strongly
significant. The rest of the coefficients are not significantly different from zero which
could be attributed to one of two factors: (i) the reduced variation in the dependent
variables or (ii) the reduced and non-random sample of exporters in our data.
As described in the econometric section, using this estimation we construct ηij to
control for the sample selection effect and a polynomial approximation to h(ωij) which
allows us to control for the effects of firm heterogeneity on aggregate trade flows. These
constructs are then included as regressors in the next stage where we estimate a gravity-
type regression of aggregate bilateral trade flows on these variables as well as on the
standard variables considered in the literature. The results of this exercise are presented
in table 7 next to the results of estimating a gravity equation without taking into account
11
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the intensive-margin effects of trade promotion agencies. Recall that this estimation also
includes exporter and importer fixed effects which allow us to control for the potential
biases that might arise from the non-inclusion of the multilateral resistance terms (given
by the ideal price indices).8 As it can be seen in the first column of table 7, all the
variables in this estimation have the expected sign and are highly significant: while
distance reduces the expected trade volume, sharing a border, a language, a colonizer,
or a belief system all promote bilateral trade albeit at different intensities. If we compare
these results with those of a standard gravity equation, we find that taking into account
the intensive-margin effect cause the coefficient on distance to fall significatively while
the (positive) effect of borders is amplified. The effect on the rest of the coefficients is
of an attenuation but the difference is smaller. These results suggest the importance of
understanding the determinants not only of the extensive margin (trade volumes) but
also of the intensive margin (trade links) for the understanding of international trade
and its determinants.
So far we have established that the presence of foreign service offices increases the
probability of exporting to that country. This does not mean that foreign service does
not have an effect on the intensive margin between two countries as we do not control
for this on the gravity equation. Unfortunately, our identification strategy does not
allow us to include the same variable in both the selection equation and the gravity
equation.
For this reason, and to disentangle the differential effect on the intensive and exten-
sive margins, we do two different exercises. In a first test, we repeat the previous two
steps and include in the gravity regression the number of embassies, consulates, or trade
promotion offices beyond the first one in that given bilateral relationship. The results
are displayed in the first column of table 8. We find the coefficient on this variable in
the second stage to be statistically not different from zero. This reinforces our prior that
the presence of any such agency is really important for the formation of trade links but
that its effect on the extensive margin (once we control for the effect on the intensive
margin) is not important.
The second exercise we perform involves the use of an additional variable to identify
the model, variable also aimed at capturing the role of informational asymmetries on the
extensive margin.9 It has been suggested that the emergence of information technology
has helped reduce the cost of acquiring and transmitting information. We define this
variable as the interaction between the density of internet servers in the importing
country interacted with the density of internet connections in the exporting country.
This measure aims to capture the potential amount of information available about an
8See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for a discussion on the importance of multilateral resistance
and the biases arising from its omission and Feenstra (2002) for a discussion on a fixed effect correction
of the omitted variable bias.
9Alternatively, we could use religious similarity to identify our empirical model as in HMR. Given
our emphasis on uncertainty, we prefer our information technology variable.
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importing country (server density) that could be available to the average firm in the
exporting country (internet connections density).10 We include this variable in our
selection equation instead of the variable on the presence of a foreign service office. In
the second stage, we include the number of embassies and consulates over and above the
first one and as it can be seen in the second column of table 8 we do not find this variable
to be different from zero at standard significance levels. We take this result as further
evidence of the importance of the first international agency on the extensive margin of
international trade but its negligible effect on the intensive margin after controlling for
the previous effect.
How does this finding compare to Rose (2005) who finds that that the effect of
foreign service is of a 6-10% increase in bilateral exports for each additional consulate?
It is, first of all, important to point out that they are not incompatible given that Rose
(2005) uses bilateral flows between countries without correcting neither for the selection
effect nor for exporter heterogeneity. Thus, the effect he reports could be driven by this
two biases and simply be capturing the fact that foreign missions do indeed increase
the probability of trading with a given country.
As we mentioned in the econometric section, one of the main concerns in Rose (2005),
as well as in the present work, is the potential endogeneity arising from the decision
to set up embassies, consulates, and trade promotion offices according to the importing
country’s market attractiveness. This problem could be especially pervasive for us given
our focus on the extensive and intensive margins: the presence of a foreign service office
is likely to be correlated with both margins and, thus, not a valid instrument for the
selection equation. To this effect, we instrument the presence of an embassy in the host
(importing) country by its tourist attractiveness and geopolitical importance. We use
the set of variables described in the econometric section to proxy these two concepts in
an additional stage to our procedure, where we estimate a probit for the presence of an
embassy on those variables. The results of this estimation are presented in table 9 in
the Appendix for two possible sets of instruments. These estimates are, then, used to
construct the instrument which is, essentially, the probability that the exporting country
has, indeed, an international agency in the importing country (i.e. the predicted value
from this regression). The coefficient on all variables are quite consistent across both
specifications. Using the predicted probabilities from these estimations, we re-estimate
our selection and gravity equations with the two instruments we construct, one for the
restricted and one for the expanded instrument sets.
The results of the estimation of the selection equation are presented in table 10.
While the results across the two instrumentations are quite similar, two main facts are
10The variable is defined as the interaction between the number of internet servers per one million
people in the importing country and the number of internet users per 1000 people in the exporting
country. The results subsequently described are robust to the use of similar measures for each variable
such as overall counts and existing bandwidth.
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quite striking. The first one is the increased importance of the presence of an embassy
or consulate in the formation of trade links: the coefficient in this specification is around
0.185 relative to 0.113 in the standard selection equation, both of them quite precisely
estimated. The second and first surprising result is the estimated coefficient on most of
the controls used in this regression which have the opposite signs as one would expect
and as we obtained earlier. This apparent contradiction is attributable to the inclusion
of this same set of controls in the instrumenting regression where, for instance, distance
has a large and significative negative coefficient. The composite effect of distance (and
most other controls) has the expected sign once we take into account its effect on the
predicted probability of the presence of a trade promotion agency.
Table 11 shows the estimation results of the gravity estimation. The first two
columns correspond to the two possible instruments we defined for the presence of
a foreign service office which, in turn, generated different (albeit very close) prediction
for the existence of trade links and which, subsequently generate the correction for the
sample selection (ηij) and for the firm heterogeneity correction (h(ωij)). The gravity
results are very similar across the two instrumentation strategies considered and, in
turn, very close to the ones we obtained without performing any instrumentation. We
report the same standard gravity as we did in the table with the earlier results and the
same comparison still applies. The coefficient on distance is sensibly reduced from an
estimated -1.215 to just -1.037 for the most complete set of instruments. A similar pat-
tern can be observed on the estimation of the common colonizer effect whose magnitude
drops from 0.73 to around 0.58. Other coefficients see their effects amplified, such as
the one on the presence of a common land border whose estimated effect jumps from
an estimated 0.54 in the standard gravity model to around 0.95 in the estimation where
we control for trade link formation.11 The coefficients on sharing a common language
and on religious similarity do not seem to be altered by this correction.
4.2 Sectoral results
Having established the importance of foreign service offices only for the extensive margin
we now turn to a sector-by-sector estimation of the importance of this margin. We first
perform the simple two-stage procedure, and then correct for the potential endogeneity
and employ the instrumentation of the presence of an embassy or consulate.
We estimate equation (1) for all 62 sectors with the only exception of that for sector
35 (“Electric current”) since the large number of non-existing values (over 98% of all
possible values) prevents the estimation from being carried out. Table 12 displays the
estimated marginal effect of the presence of an official agency on the existence of a
given bilateral trade link. The estimated coefficient is positive and significant at over
11These coefficients imply a border effect of around 71% in the standard gravity estimation and of
close to 150% for the corrected model.
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the 1% level for all sectors; the corresponding marginal effect are somewhat larger in
magnitude to the one we estimated for the aggregate trade flows. This effect is a
direct consequence of the significantly larger proportion of zero flows in the sectoral
data relative to the aggregate data. There are also some interesting differences when
examining the magnitude of the coefficient across sectors: the impact is significantly
larger for sectors producing more differentiated goods, such as 1-digit SITC sectors
6 (“Manufactured goods”) and 7 (“Machinery and transport equipment”), than for
sectors where homogenous goods play a more significant role, such as sectors 2 (“Crude
materials”), 3 (“Mineral fuels”), and 4 (“Animal and vegetable oils”).
The tables containing the full regression results are not presented, due to space
constraints, but are available from the authors. Instead, table 13 shows the complete
regression results for a few selected sectors:
4 Cereals and cereal preparations
25 Pulp and waste paper
58 Plastics in non-primary forms
65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, and related products
77 Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances
78 Road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles)
The first two sectors could be defined as homogeneous goods sectors, while the last
two ones fall squarely in the category of heterogonous/differentiated goods. As empha-
sized by Rauch (1999) that argues that search barriers are larger for more differentiated
goods, we would expect our selection variable related to information asymmetries among
countries to have a stronger effect on the later than on the former. This intuition is
confirmed by the results: the marginal effect on the probability of the existence of a
trade link increases substantially more with the presence of an official agency in sectors
77 and 78 (with marginal effects of 51.8% and 43.3%) than in sectors 4 and 25 (with
marginal effects of 38.9% and 18%).
Next, we estimate the gravity equation for every sector including among the regres-
sors the standard determinants as well as the terms constructed in the first stage. We
find these correction terms to be significant in all but 11 of the 61 sectors at standard
significance levels.12 Regarding the coefficients on the rest of variables, we observe the
same qualitative effects as we do in the aggregate results. We present the results of the
gravity estimation for selected sectors in table 14. Sectors 4 and 25 appear to be among
the 11 sectors for which the selection and heterogeneity correction do not appear to be
jointly significant in the gravity estimation.
12Recall that we are unable to perform the estimation for sector 35.
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In this sectoral estimation, we correct for the potential endogeneity in the same
fashion as we did in the estimation of aggregate bilateral trade flows. Given that neither
the dependent variable nor the independent variables in the instrumentation stage vary
according to sector, we simply use as instruments the two variables we generated earlier
using two different instrumentation sets.
Table 15 reports the marginal effect of the instrument constructed using the ex-
panded instrument set in the probit regression for the existence of a sectoral bilateral
trade flow. We find the effect to be positive and significantly different from zero at the
1% in all sectors. We find the same pattern as we did before correcting for the endogene-
ity in the decision to set up an official agency. However, the estimated marginal effects
of the instrumented presence of an embassy or consulate on the probability of observing
a positive trade flow are now significantly larger than those estimated without instru-
mentation. We attribute this difference in magnitude to the fact that the new dependent
variable is actually the probability that there is an embassy of the exporting country in
the importing country for every country pair instead of the given actual presence of this
embassy, which we considered earlier. In other words, the dependent variable used to
predict the existence of a trade flow, which was an indicator variable in table 12, is now
a continuous variable, which forces us to change the interpretation of the coefficient.
When interpreting these coefficients, it is useful to keep in mind that the average of
the indicator variable for the presence of a trade promotion agency is around 0.666.
In any case, we still find that the estimated marginal effects are significantly larger for
sectors producing more differentiated goods relative to sectors more associated with the
production of homogenous goods. Table 16 reports the full regression results for a few
selected sectors. We find similar results as we did for the aggregate results: most of the
coefficients on the standard gravity controls do not have the expected signs. We are not
concerned about this since these variables only constitute controls and, again, attribute
this result to the inclusion of these same set of controls in the instrumenting equation
for the presence of an international agency of the exporting country in the importing
country.
Finally, we estimate a gravity equation including the same set of controls as well
as our constructs from the previous estimation that allow us to control for sample
selection (the intensive margin) and firm heterogeneity in the determination of trade
volumes (the extensive margin). We report the results of this estimation in table 17 for
selected sectors.13 We find the same qualitative results as we did in the previous (non-
instrumented) estimation with the coefficients on the selection and firm heterogeneity
controls being jointly significant in 54 out of the 61 for which we perform the estimation.
13As usual, the complete tables are available from the author’s upon request.
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5 Conclusions and policy implications
In this paper we analyze the importance of international promotion activities in deter-
mining trade flows. In doing so we disentangle the differential effect that these activities
may have both at creating new potential partners and at increasing the volume of trade
with existing partners. Using cross-sectional data and following HMR and Rose (2005),
our results indicate that having a foreign service agency in a country increases the prob-
ability of exporting to that country in between 11 and 18% at the aggregate level, while
it does not appear to have an additional effect on the volume of exports. At the sectoral
level the results are qualitatively similar, with foreign services mattering more at the
extensive margin in more differentiated goods sectors, a result that is consistent with
what the literature has previously emphasized.
These results suggest that uncertainty may be an important barrier for trade as
long as two countries do not trade with each other. However, once they are already ex-
changing goods, either information flows between them (perhaps through informational
externalities as emphasized in Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia, 2007, or through the
creation of informal networks as emphasized by Rauch, 1996), or the remaining uncer-
tainty is something international promotion agencies can not help overcome. Whatever
the answer is, it is hard to find an economic justification for the increasing prolifera-
tion of export promotion offices among trade partners, based on uncertainty as their
justification.
17
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6 Data Appendix
Table 1: List of sectors
Code Description
0 Food and live animals
01 Meat and meat preparations
02 Dairy products and birds’ eggs
03 Fish (not marine mammals), crustaceans, molluscs and aquatic invertebrates
04 Cereals and cereal preparations
05 Vegetables and fruit
06 Sugars, sugar preparations and honey
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, and manufactures thereof
08 Feeding stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals)
09 Miscellaneous edible products and preparations
1 Beverages and tobacco
11 Beverages
12 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels
21 Hides, skins and furskins, raw
22 Oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits
23 Crude rubber (including synthetic and reclaimed)
24 Cork and wood
25 Pulp and waste paper
26 Textile fibres (other than wool tops and other combed wool)
and their wastes (not manufactured into yarn or fabric)
27 Crude fertilizers, other than those of division 56,
and crude minerals (excluding coal, petroleum and precious stones)
28 Metalliferous ores and metal scrap
29 Crude animal and vegetable materials
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials
32 Coal, coke and briquettes
33 Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials
34 Gas, natural and manufactured
35 Electric current
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes
41 Animal oils and fats
42 Fixed vegetable fats and oils, crude, refined or fractionated
43 Animal or vegetable fats and oils, processed; waxes of animal or vegetable origin;
inedible mixtures or preparations of animal or vegetable fats or oils
5 Chemicals and related products
51 Organic chemicals
52 Inorganic chemicals
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Table 2: List of sectors (cont’d)
Code Description
53 Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials
54 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products
55 Essential oils and resinoids and perfume materials;
toilet, polishing and cleansing preparations
56 Fertilizers (other than those of group 272)
57 Plastics in primary forms
58 Plastics in non-primary forms
59 Chemical materials and products
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material
61 Leather, leather manufactures, and dressed furskins
62 Rubber manufactures
63 Cork and wood manufactures (excluding furniture)
64 Paper, paperboard and articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard
65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, and related products
66 Non-metallic mineral manufactures,
67 Iron and steel
68 Non-ferrous metals
69 Manufactures of metals
7 Machinery and transport equipment
71 Power-generating machinery and equipment
72 Machinery specialized for particular industries
73 Metalworking machinery
74 General industrial machinery and equipment, and machine parts
75 Office machines and automatic data-processing machines
76 Telecommunications and sound-recording
and reproducing apparatus and equipment
77 Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances and electrical
parts thereof (including non-electrical counterparts)
78 Road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles)
79 Other transport equipment
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles
81 Prefabricated buildings; sanitary, plumbing, heating
and lighting fixtures and fittings
82 Furniture, and parts thereof
83 Travel goods, handbags and similar containers
84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories
85 Footwear
87 Professional, scientific and controlling instruments and apparatus
88 Photographic apparatus, equipment and supplies and
optical goods; watches and clocks
89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles
9 Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC
91 Postal packages not classified according to kind
93 Special transactions and commodities not classified according to kind
96 Coin (other than gold coin), not being legal tender
97 Gold, non-monetary (excluding gold ores and concentrates)
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Table 3: List of exporters and importers
Afghanistan Dominican Rep. Korea (North) Romania
Albania Ecuador Korea (South) Russian Federation
Algeria Egypt Kuwait Rwanda
Angola El Salvador Lao P.Dem.R Samoa
Argentina Eq.Guinea Latvia Saudi Arabia
Armenia Estonia Lebanon Senegal
Australia Ethiopia Liberia Seychelles
Austria Falkland Islands Libya Sierra Leone
Bahamas Fiji Lithuania Singapore
Bahrain Finland Madagascar Slovakia
Bangladesh French Ind. Or. Malawi Slovenia
Barbados French Guiana Malaysia Somalia
Belarus France Mali South Africa
Belgium (Lux.) Gabon Malta Spain
Belize Gambia Mauritania Sri Lanka
Benin Georgia Mauritius St.Kitt and Nevis
Bermuda Germany Mexico Sudan
Bolivia Ghana Mongolia Suriname
Brazil Greece Morocco Sweden
Bulgaria Greenland Mozambique Switzerland
Burkina Faso Guadeloupe Myanmar Syria
Burundi Guatemala Nepal TFYR Macedonia
Cambodia Guinea Aruba Tanzania
Cameroon Guinea-Bissau Netherlands Thailand
Canada Guyana New Calednia Togo
Cent.Afr.Rep Haiti New Zealand Trinidad Tobago
Chad Honduras Nicaragua Tunisia
Chile Hungary Niger Turkey
China Iceland Nigeria United Kingdom
Hong Kong India Norway United States
Macao Indonesia Oman Uganda
Colombia Iran Pakistan Ukraine
Congo Iraq Panama United Arab Emirates
Costa Rica Ireland Papua New Guinea Uruguay
Cote d’Ivoire Israel Paraguay Uzbekistan
Cuba Italy Peru Venezuela
Cyprus Jamaica Philippines Vietnam
Czech Rep Japan Poland Yemen
Dem. Rep. of Congo Jordan Portugal Zambia
Denmark Kazakhstan Qatar Zimbabwe
Djibouti Kenya Rep Moldova
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Table 4: Share of zeros per sector
Sector Share of 1’s Share of 0’s Sector Share of 1’s Share of 0’s
1 25.87% 74.13% 55 48.79% 51.21%
2 31.13% 68.87% 56 21.11% 78.89%
3 26.81% 73.19% 57 11.58% 88.42%
4 44.56% 55.44% 58 51.26% 48.74%
5 42.56% 57.44% 59 51.44% 48.56%
6 34.60% 65.40% 61 27.75% 72.25%
7 36.48% 63.52% 62 51.97% 48.03%
8 28.37% 71.63% 63 36.04% 63.96%
9 39.62% 60.38% 64 52.79% 47.21%
11 34.57% 65.43% 65 58.70% 41.30%
12 28.57% 71.43% 66 55.47% 44.53%
21 12.40% 87.60% 67 57.00% 43.00%
22 16.55% 83.45% 68 43.77% 56.23%
23 24.37% 75.63% 69 60.79% 39.21%
24 23.90% 76.10% 71 55.91% 44.09%
25 16.87% 83.13% 72 63.70% 36.30%
26 36.45% 63.55% 73 38.71% 61.29%
27 32.16% 67.84% 74 65.17% 34.83%
28 23.40% 76.60% 75 46.36% 53.64%
29 32.63% 67.37% 76 56.44% 43.56%
32 12.64% 87.36% 77 66.61% 33.39%
33 38.12% 61.88% 78 66.14% 33.86%
34 8.94% 91.06% 79 38.36% 61.64%
35 1.70% 98.30% 81 36.16% 63.84%
41 9.26% 90.74% 82 45.86% 54.14%
42 26.16% 73.84% 83 26.01% 73.99%
43 17.64% 82.36% 84 42.36% 57.64%
51 48.00% 52.00% 85 35.57% 64.43%
52 40.80% 59.20% 87 53.82% 46.18%
53 45.15% 54.85% 88 39.21% 60.79%
54 57.44% 42.56% 89 62.76% 37.24%
        1 corresponds to an existing flow; 0 to a zero or to non-existing values.
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics of the variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
Value (1000 US$) 210924 18741 267216 0 56700000
1(Value > 0) 210924 0.381 0.486 0 1
Value (log) 80467 7.953 2.193 0 17.853
Aggregate value 210924 1196859 7040360 0 202000000
1(Agg. Value > 0) 210924 0.920 0.271 0 1.000
Distance (log) 205716 8.727 0.771 5.277463 9.894
Common border 209994 0.027 0.163 0 1
Common language 209994 0.130 0.336 0 1
Common colonizer 209994 0.015 0.121 0 1
Religious similarity 188790 33.238 30.711 0 99.800
FTA 210924 0.053 0.225 0 1
CU 210924 0.013 0.113 0 1
Number of embasies & consulates 206522 1.136 1.900 0 43.000
Presence of an embasy or consulate 210924 0.666 0.472 0 1
Zagat’s guides 206522 0.404 3.127 0 40
Baedeker guides 206522 0.275 0.804 0 6
Condé-Nast top 100 206522 0.312 1.103 0 10
Lonely Planet guides 206522 0.213 0.848 0 10
Michelin guides 206522 0.242 1.202 0 13
Economist city guides 206522 0.128 0.540 0 6
Oil reserves 206522 6.30E+10 2.64E+11 0 2.62E+12
Gas reserves 206522 9.57E+12 4.48E+13 0 4.79E+14
Bandwidth per person 165354 484.95 1518.23 0.0151 10791.04
Bandwidth per 1000 161448 6.975 20.762 0 164.845
Broadband subscribers 162750 269261.3 1365534.0 0 12800000
Computersper 1000 178374 115.131 160.431 0.4920776 683.282
International bandwidth 166656 11333.0 42132.6 0.064 273770
Internet servers 154938 965.1 7005.1 1 78126.0
Internet servers per million 153636 34.714 73.584 0.00761 497.181
Internet users 199206 2989451 12600000 0 143000000
Internet users per 1000 199206 101.95 145.29 0 603.51
Personal computers 178374 3595783 15800000 1100 178000000
Information technology 153636 6.286154 2.921118 -2.964339 12.45739
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Table 6: First stage: Probit regression for the existence of a trade flow
Dependent variable: Indicator for the existence of a trade flow
Presence of a foreign service office 0.113***
(0.015)
Distance (log) -0.019***
(0.005)
Common border -0.127*
(0.074)
Common colonizer 0.004
(0.016)
Common language -0.007
(0.009)
Religious similarity 0.000
(0.000)
Observations 2453
Marginal effects reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Included, but not reported, are exporter fixed effects.
* significant at the 10%; ** significant at the 5%; *** significant at the 1%
Table 7: Second stage: Gravity regression
Dependent variable: Value of aggregate bilateral trade
Correcting for selection Regular
and heterogeneity Gravity
Distance (log) -1.062*** -1.215***
(0.060) (0.044)
Common border 0.831*** 0.544***
(0.200) (0.189)
Common colonizer 0.662*** 0.734***
(0.232) (0.233)
Common language 0.428*** 0.497***
(0.075) (0.077)
Religious similarity 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 2277 2277
R-squared 0.99 0.99
F-test (significance of 1st stage instruments) 25.13 n/a
Prob(F > 0) 0.00 n/a
          Included, but not reported, are exporter and importer fixed effects.
          Robust standard errors in parentheses
          * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 8: The importance of the extensive and intensive margins
Dependent variable: Value of aggregate bilateral trade
(1) (2)
Distance (log) -0.936*** -1.049***
(0.05) (0.04)
Common border 0.788*** 0.509***
(0.163) (0.143)
Common colonizer 0.937*** 1.066***
(0.219) (0.228)
Common language 0.561*** 0.526***
(0.067) (0.066)
Religious similarity 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Number of embassies 0.023 0.018
and consulates over one (0.014) (0.012)
Observations 2138 2138
R-squared 1.00 1.00
Included, but not reported, are exporter and importer fixed effects.
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Table 9: Instrumenting the presence of a foreign service office
Dependent variable: Indicator for the presence of an embassy or consulate.
Zagat’s surveys 0.163*** 0.147***
(0.019) (0.018)
Condé-Nast top destinations -0.001 -0.004
(0.005) (0.007)
Lonely Planet guides 0.181*** 0.196***
(0.031) (0.034)
Economist city guides 0.069* 0.068
(0.040) (0.042)
Oil Reserves 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Michelin guides 0.016
(0.026)
Baedeker guides 0.025
(0.020)
Gas Reserves 0.000
(0.000)
Distance (log) -0.065*** -0.072***
(0.017) (0.019)
Common border 0.022 0.025
(0.024) (0.028)
Common colonizer 0.032** 0.036**
(0.014) (0.016)
Common language 0.031*** 0.035***
(0.010) (0.011)
Religious similarity 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 3033 3033
         Marginal effects reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses
         * significant at the 10%; ** significant at the 5%; *** significant at the 1%
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Table 10: First stage: Probit regression for the existence of a trade flow
Dependent variable: Indicator for the existence of a trade flow
(1) (2)
Presence of a foreign service office 0.184*** 0.183***
(instrumented) (0.025) (0.025)
Distance (log) 0.009* 0.011**
(0.005) (0.005)
Common border -0.045 -0.042
(0.040) (0.039)
Common colonizer -0.013 -0.014
(0.032) (0.031)
Common language -0.037** -0.039**
(0.017) (0.017)
Religious similarity 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2453 2453
Marginal effects reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Included, but not reported, are exporter fixed effects.
* significant at the 10%; ** significant at the 5%; *** significant at the 1%
Table 11: Second stage: Gravity regression
Dependent variable: Value of aggregate bilateral trade
(1) (2) Regular Gravity
Distance (log) -1.022*** -1.037*** -1.215***
(0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
Common border 0.952*** 0.948*** 0.544***
(0.186) (0.184) (0.189)
Common colonizer 0.577** 0.579** 0.734***
(0.232) (0.232) (0.233)
Common language 0.513*** 0.520*** 0.497***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.077)
Religious similarity 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 2277 2277 2277
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99
F-test (significance of 1st stage instruments) 10.60 17.25 n/a
Prob(F > 0) 0.00 0.00 n/a
Included, but not reported, are exporter and importer fixed effects.
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Table 12: First stage: Estimated marginal effect of the presence of a foreign service
office on the existence of a bilateral trade flow by sector
Sector Marginal effect Sector Marginal effect
1 0.223*** 55 0.479***
2 0.240*** 56 0.192***
3 0.291*** 57 0.085***
4 0.389*** 58 0.606***
5 0.434*** 59 0.557***
6 0.359*** 61 0.334***
7 0.383*** 62 0.541***
8 0.324*** 63 0.390***
9 0.398*** 64 0.521***
11 0.301*** 65 0.527***
12 0.266*** 66 0.544***
21 0.130*** 67 0.455***
22 0.157*** 68 0.548***
23 0.309*** 69 0.533***
24 0.262*** 71 0.547***
25 0.180*** 72 0.499***
26 0.396*** 73 0.460***
27 0.404*** 74 0.540***
28 0.293*** 75 0.522***
29 0.401*** 76 0.534***
32 0.106*** 77 0.518***
33 0.407*** 78 0.433***
34 0.043*** 79 0.319***
35 — 81 0.413***
41 0.062*** 82 0.480***
42 0.245*** 83 0.256***
43 0.180*** 84 0.409***
51 0.550*** 85 0.341***
52 0.476*** 87 0.565***
53 0.524*** 88 0.448***
54 0.555*** 89 0.521***
                  All regressions include as controls distance (log), common border, common language,
and religious similarity, as well as fixed exporter effects.
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Table 13: First stage: Probit regression for the existence of a trade flow for selected
sectors
Dependent variable: Indicator for the presence of a sectoral trade flow
Sector 4 Sector 25 Sector 58 Sector 65 Sector 77 Sector 78
Presence of a foreign 0.389*** 0.180*** 0.606*** 0.527*** 0.518*** 0.433***
service office (0.021) (0.011) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Distance (log) -0.256*** -0.060*** -0.202*** -0.158*** -0.140*** -0.144***
(0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Common border 0.071 0.247*** 0.102 0.092 0.059 0.074
(0.084) (0.076) (0.085) (0.086) (0.077) (0.065)
Common colonizer 0.045 -0.076*** -0.060 -0.068 0.107** 0.018
(0.089) (0.018) (0.091) (0.126) (0.054) (0.070)
Common language 0.099*** -0.011 0.068** -0.013 -0.020 0.048*
(0.035) (0.017) (0.035) (0.033) (0.029) (0.025)
Religious similarity 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2991 2890 2991 2991 2991 2991
Marginal effects reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Included, but not reported, are exporter fixed effects.
* significant at the 10%; ** significant at the 5%; *** significant at the 1%
30
         BANCO DE ESPAÑA       37 DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO N.º 0808 
Table 14: Second stage: Gravity regression for selected sectors
Dependent variable: Value of sectoral bilateral trade
Sector 4 Sector 25 Sector 58 Sector 65 Sector 77 Sector 78
Distance (log) -0.961*** -0.885*** -1.367*** -1.253*** -1.149*** -1.023***
(0.137) (0.210) (0.079) (0.079) (0.069) (0.083)
Common border 0.941*** 0.021 0.773*** 0.694*** 0.630*** 0.587**
(0.231) (0.442) (0.208) (0.193) (0.208) (0.234)
Common colonizer 0.420 0.800 0.888** 0.384 0.974*** 0.884**
(0.390) (0.909) (0.349) (0.287) (0.304) (0.373)
Common language 0.590*** 0.440* 0.468*** 0.305*** 0.708*** 0.379***
(0.138) (0.237) (0.094) (0.097) (0.087) (0.108)
Religious similarity 0.004* 0.001 0.003* 0.005*** 0.003** -0.000
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 1385 551 1613 1832 2076 2067
R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98
F-test (significance 1.88 1.97 4.36 3.64 3.13 6.78
of 1st stage instruments)
Prob (F>0) 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
         Included, but not reported, are exporter and importer fixed effects.
         Robust standard errors in parentheses
         * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 15: First stage: Coefficient of the instrument for presence of a foreign service
office on the existence of a bilateral trade flow by sector
Sector Coefficient Sector Coefficient
1 0.739*** 55 1.454***
2 0.890*** 56 0.552***
3 1.122*** 57 0.259***
4 1.218*** 58 1.714***
5 1.630*** 59 1.744***
6 1.375*** 61 1.288***
7 1.363*** 62 1.534***
8 1.180*** 63 1.567***
9 1.386*** 64 1.362***
11 1.147*** 65 1.455***
12 0.802*** 66 1.579***
21 0.376*** 67 1.415***
22 0.496*** 68 1.803***
23 1.087*** 69 1.298***
24 0.960*** 71 1.591***
25 0.580*** 72 1.122***
26 1.210*** 73 1.719***
27 1.482*** 74 1.353***
28 1.096*** 75 1.765***
29 1.515*** 76 1.441***
32 0.354*** 77 1.332***
33 1.388*** 78 0.980***
34 0.136*** 79 1.322***
35 — 81 1.459***
41 0.175*** 82 1.583***
42 0.845*** 83 1.021***
43 0.588*** 84 1.476***
51 1.761*** 85 1.271***
52 1.575*** 87 1.666***
53 1.628*** 88 1.678***
54 1.445*** 89 1.493***
            All regressions include as controls distance (log), common border, common language,
and religious similarity, as well as fixed exporter effects.
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Table 16: First stage: Probit regression for the existence of a trade flow for selected
sectors
Dependent variable: Indicator for the presence of a sectoral trade flow
Sector 4 Sector 25 Sector 58 Sector 65 Sector 77 Sector 78
Presence of a foreign 1.218*** 0.580*** 1.714*** 1.455*** 1.332*** 0.980***
service office (0.062) (0.034) (0.069) (0.067) (0.065) (0.055)
Distance (log) -0.129*** -0.006 0.010 0.027 0.058*** -0.019
(0.022) (0.008) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017)
Common border 0.079 0.245*** 0.123 0.153** 0.104* 0.105**
(0.085) (0.072) (0.078) (0.069) (0.053) (0.052)
Common colonizer 0.013 -0.065*** -0.110 -0.192* 0.028 -0.052
(0.088) (0.012) (0.086) (0.114) (0.062) (0.077)
Common language 0.018 -0.037*** -0.063* -0.129*** -0.164*** -0.024
(0.036) (0.011) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.030)
Religious similarity 0.001** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2990 2889 2990 2990 2990 2990
Included, but not reported, are exporter and importer fixed effects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 17: Second stage: Gravity regression for selected sectors
Dependent variable: Value of sectoral bilateral trade
Sector 4 Sector 25 Sector 58 Sector 65 Sector 77 Sector 78
Distance (log) -0.975*** -0.975*** -1.219*** -1.087*** -1.043*** -0.974***
(0.155) (0.174) (0.068) (0.072) (0.056) (0.090)
Common border 0.905*** -0.269 0.550*** 0.484** 0.302 0.516**
(0.228) (0.404) (0.196) (0.214) (0.199) (0.234)
Common colonizer 0.384 0.981 0.806** 0.364 0.896*** 0.942***
(0.389) (0.894) (0.340) (0.296) (0.282) (0.364)
Common language 0.597*** 0.483** 0.425*** 0.317*** 0.787*** 0.361***
(0.137) (0.238) (0.090) (0.096) (0.084) (0.110)
Religious similarity 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.004*** 0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 1385 551 1613 1832 2076 2067
R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98
F-test (significance 4.23 2.37 13.87 8.85 13.34 3.84
of 1st stage instruments)
Prob(F>0) 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Included, but not reported, are exporter and importer fixed effects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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